Abstrak

Makalah ini membahas Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (SMT)yang dikembangkan oleh filsuf dan neurosaintis Jerman, Thomas Metzinger. Secara umum, SMT menyatakan bahwa “diri” tidak perlu dipahami sebagai entitas metafisik yang berdiri sendiri. Apa yang kita alami sebagai diri merupakan hasil dari proses representasi saraf yang membentuk model-diri fenomenal atau Phenomenal Self-Model (PSM). Karena model ini bekerja secara transparan, subjek tidak menyadari bahwa pengalaman tentang “aku” adalah sebuah konstruksi. Dari titik inilah ilusi tentang diri muncul. Dengan memadukan neurofenomenologi, filsafat pikiran analitik, dan temuan empiris mengenai pengalaman luar tubuh serta lucid dreaming, Metzinger menawarkan kerangka naturalistik yang radikal untukmemahamikesadaran,selfhood,dansubjektivitas. Makalah ini menelaah arsitektur konseptual SMT, sejumlah kritik utama terhadapnya, serta implikasinya bagi etika, filsafat agama, dan diskursus tentang kecerdasan buatan.

Kata Kunci

Thomas Metzinger Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity Phenomenal Self-Model kesadaran naturalisme fenomenologis ilusi diri neurofenomenologi

Referensi

  1. Batchelor, S. (1997). Buddhism Without Beliefs: A Contemporary Guide to Awakening. Riverhead Books. Blanke, O., Ortigue, S., Landis, T., & Seeck, M. (2002). Stimulating illusory own-body perceptions. Nature, 419(6904), 269–270. Blanke, O., & Arzy, S. (2005). The out-of-body experience: Disturbed self-processing at the temporo-parietal junction. The Neuroscientist, 11(1), 16–24. Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands “feel” touch that eyes see. Nature, 391(6669), 756. Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 200–219. Collins, S. (1982). Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism. Cambridge University Press. Frith, C. D. (1992). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: Implications for cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(1), 14–21. LaBerge, S. (1985). Lucid Dreaming. Ballantine Books. Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64(4), 354–361. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/2012). Phenomenology of Perception (D. A. Landes, Trans.). Routledge. Metzinger, T. (2003). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MITPress. Metzinger, T. (2009). The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self. Basic Books. Metzinger, T. (2010). The Phenomenal Self-Model (PSM) and the Bodily Self. In S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (Eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (hlm. 375–422). Springer. Metzinger, T. (2021). Artificial suffering: An argument for a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology. Journal of Artificial Intelligence andKAELANSILVERCREST 18 Consciousness, 8(1), 43–66. Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. Nagel, T. (2012). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. Oxford University Press. Ramachandran, V. S., & Blakeslee, S. (1998). Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind. William Morrow. Sierra, M., & Berrios, G. E. (1998). Depersonalization: Neurobiological perspectives. Biological Psychiatry, 44(9), 898–908. Strawson, G. (1997). The self. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4(5–6), 405–428. Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Harvard University Press. Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. MIT Press. Zahavi,D.(2011). Phenomenologyandtheproblemofself. InS.Gallagher (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self (hlm. 137–155). Oxford University Press.